Interesting points from a reader:
The decision of the International Criminal Court to indict Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder and forcible displacement of peoples (but not genocide due to lack of evidence) in the Darfur crisis opens a can of worms. First, his retaliatory gesture of expelling humanitarian aid organizations leaves over two million refugees vulnerable to hunger and disease and further violence. The question still remains whether they would be better off by insisting on the indictment, or by using it as a threat to put pressure on him to change his policies.
The ICC’s decision to prosecute could still be overruled by the UN Security Council (France, Russia, China and Britain might do that if al-Bashir ends the war in Darfur and allows the refugees return home.) But, ironically, the United States, which has not even joined the ICC, rejects such action lest it undermine the court’s deterrent effect. And some international aid organizations have avoided taking a stand, fearing to jeopardise their position on the ground. Moreover, some African and Arab states dismiss the ICC’s decisions, apparently rejecting the application of international law in the case of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. So this first the indictment against a sitting president is not as clear as one might have hoped it would be.
If only I could put it so coherently. I’m still undecided: while I appreciate decisive action, and I think we really need it in terms of Darfur, unless this ICC indictment actually serves as much needed pressure on Al-Bashir to change, what sticks are left? Will the UN Security Council ensure that the follow-up is swift and coherent militarily? As Kristof suggested, should Al-Bashir continue hemming chaos in Darfur, would the US consider blowing up some of their planes from a nearby military base? Another stick. In either case, can we justify the added pain caused by aid pull-out? It remains to be seen.